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A RESIDENT OF EVIDENCELAND DEFENDS His TURF
By RichardD. Friedman

A few years ago, I wrote an essay welcoming Judge Richard
Posner down from a star to Evidenceland, the sometimes obscure
province occupied by evidence scholars.1 Although I criticized one of
the points of his article on the economics of evidence law, I expressed
the hope that he would remain in Evidenceland for an extended stay.2 I
should have known that if he did so he would tell us long-term
inhabitants what we have been doing wrong.
Judge Posner has been teaching a course that he calls Evidence,
though frankly it sounds more like Trial Advocacy for Students Who
Have Not Taken Evidence. Although he assigns some materials of the
type that are used in a conventional Evidence course (including, I
understand to my gratification, my own coursebook) and lectures on the
rules of evidence for the first few class sessions, the heart of the course
is simulated trials based on case files of the National Institute for Trial
Advocacy ("NITA"). He organizes the course this way because he is
convinced that "you can learn [the rules of evidence] only by applying
them and not by studying them (just as you can learn to ride a bicycle
only by doing it and not by studying the pertinent rules of physics),
because their meaning and significance emerge only in the context of a
trial."
I am sure the course is a wonderful experience for students, and
that they learn a great deal. Indeed, if a student decided to take this
course-taught by one of our leading legal scholars and appellate
judges, who is also an experienced trial judge-rather than a
conventional Evidence course taught by, say, someone like me, I could
hardly fault the choice. Moreover, I am sure that a Trial Advocacy
course is an excellent one for any law student or lawyer to take,

1.

Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52

STAN. L. REv. 873 (2000).

2.

Id. at 887.
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especially-but not exclusively-if the student intends to be a litigator,
and that one can learn a great deal from such a course that the student is
unlikely to learn in a conventional Evidence course. But I also believe
that students can learn a great deal in a conventional Evidence course
that they cannot in a course of the type that Judge Posner teaches. The
ideal, given enough time in a student's schedule and enough resources
in the school, is for the student to take both. The optimal order is
clearly to take the Evidence course first. 3 Furthermore, if one applies
the economic doctrine of comparative advantage and asked in which
law school course a law student could learn more of what he or she
could not learn later, either in a short course taken while in practice or in
practice itself, I believe the resulting advice usually would be: "Take
Evidence now, and fill in the Trial Advocacy later."
I certainly do not disagree with Judge Posner that a Trial Advocacy
course has advantages over the conventional Evidence course in that it
more easily gives a student a feel for application of evidentiary
principles, and that it puts evidentiary questions in the context of a full
case. An Evidence instructor concerned about these disadvantages can
compensate to a significant degree in designing the course. Roleplaying-for example, with a student acting as counsel attempting to
secure the admissibility of evidence, and the rest of the class acting as
opposing counsel-can be used quite effectively even in a large class.
And, to the extent the instructor feels that analysis of evidentiary
problems will be improved by placing them in the context of a fully
developed case, it is possible to do this by having much of the course
revolve around a limited number of case files.4 Even so, the Evidence
course will be in deficit in these respects compared to a Trial Advocacy
course.
Thus, there is a great deal of appeal in Judge Posner's bicycle
analogy. But its force only goes so far. Once one has learned how to
ride a bicycle, one can do so practically anywhere. But when one has

3. That may not appear self-evident. Trial experience gives students insights that
they can bring to the Evidence course. But, for reasons discussed below, I believe the
Evidence course gives students a grounding that can be of substantial assistance in real
or simulated trial experience. In any event, I generally find that some students in my
Evidence course have already had some trial experience, from clinics or summer jobs or
prior careers, that they are able to bring to bear in class. Interestingly, Judge Posner had
planned to have a theoretical component of his course after holding the NITA trials, but
he found (not surprisingly) that those trials "engulfed" the course.
4. This is an aspect of RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES (5th ed. 2002).
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learned how a particular evidentiary problem has been addressed and
resolved in a given setting, it is not always clear whether one has
learned anything but a war story. If the Trial Advocacy course has the
advantage of the context of a case, the Evidence course has the
advantage of the context of a broad-ranging body of law and of thought.
It can offer a systematic study and critique of the underlying principles
and goals of evidence law, and of the psychological and sociological
premises that are thought to support particular rules, a perspective on
the interconnections between the various parts, and a reasonably
rigorous study of the epistemological foundations of fact-finding. And,
without wishing to claim too much for the professoriate, it can offer
students the guidance of a scholar who has thought for some time about
this maze, which may help them work their own way through it. I am
sure in Evidence, as in most law school courses, students soon forget
most of the doctrinal points we teach them. But we can hope that, as
with other courses, the exercise itself will hone their analytical abilities,
that a fair amount of what we teach at the broader level will become part
of their intellectual landscape, and that even some of the narrower
points, though dormant, may be reawakened by the proper stimulus.
The two recurrent student suggestions about Judge Posner's course
that he reports-that he act as the trial judge and that he lecture more on
the rules of evidence-therefore strike me as significant. They suggest
that his students recognize that they are lacking a systematic view of
evidence law and theory, and that they suspect the same is true of their
classmates. And indeed, if the student judge knows very little about the
law of evidence, that will undercut the value of the exercise to the other
participants. I do not pretend that the ordinary trial judge has a
complete command of the rules of evidence as they are taught in the
conventional course, or indeed as they are enunciated at relative leisure
by treatise writers or by appellate courts. But I do believe that most trial
judges have a broader, deeper, more detailed understanding than is
likely to be had by a law student-even a very bright one at the
University of Chicago-who has not had a course in Evidence.
Much of what I have said assumes that, or at least takes on greater
force if, there is a body of Evidence law worth learning. (Whether it is
worth having is another matter.) Can this proposition be reconciled
with Judge Posner's Realist view that what judges try to do in deciding
a case, and usually are able to do, is to come up with a result that is
sensible in light of the situation that confronts them in the particular
case, and to try to make that result square with precedent, statutory
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language, and the other formal materials of legal decision making? To a
large extent, I believe it can-but to some extent, I believe Judge Posner
overstates his point. Sometimes judges will decide an evidentiary issue
without even referring to-perhaps without even being aware of-the
relevant legal materials. Indeed, often, evidentiary doctrine is so opentextured, leaving so much discretion in the hands of the trial judge, that
there is not much harm in this. And certainly judges, both trial and
appellate, often manipulate the doctrine to reach results they deem
desirable; the stretching of some hearsay exceptions is a good example
of this. But evidence law does not seem different from other areas of
the law in this respect. And the fact is that in some ways doctrine does
limit the range of possible rulings; most often the trial judge will not
even consider some outcomes because they are clearly forbidden by
law, and sometimes appellate courts will bring trial courts within
bounds.
Judge Posner is certainly correct to give preeminence to the
balancing of benefits in accurate fact-finding against a wide range of
costs, as suggested by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Nevertheless,
there are large areas of evidence law that cannot be usefully described
by that balancing test, without stretching it so far as to make it lose
usefulness. Consider the following hypotheticals:
" A witness in an assault case has decided she does not want
to come to court. But a week after the assault, she gave a
police officer her rendition of what happened, and the
officer is prepared to testify as to what she said.
* In a fraud case, plaintiff's counsel offers to present to the
jury, before any witness has testified, a letter containing
the allegedly fraudulent representation, and bearing at the
bottom what purports to be the defendant's signature.
" In a robbery case, the prosecution offers to prove that in
the last five years the defendant has committed three other
robberies. This evidence, the prosecutor says, shows that
the defendant has a strong propensity to commit robbery.
* Suspecting that the defendant made a frank confession to
his lawyer, the prosecutor asks him, "What did you tell
your lawyer about what happened?"
* Recalling that in the course of failed compromise
negotiations, defendant in a products liability case made
some statements strongly suggesting liability, plaintiffs
counsel asks her, "Well, when we were trying to settle this
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case, didn't you admit to me you were liable?"
In a date-rape case, to support his contention that the
complainant had consensual sex with him, the defendant
offers to prove that on at least three other occasions the
complainant had consensual sex with a man on their first
date.
If these hypotheticals seem somewhat farfetched, it is because, in
most American jurisdictions in this era, a lawyer would not likely offer
the evidence in question, knowing that the trial judge would almost
certainly reject the offer out of hand. And if the judge did admit the
evidence, and it appeared that the evidence plausibly had an effect on
the outcome, an appellate court would likely reverse. In these, and
many other cases that tend not to arise, and in some that do arise often,
the effects of doctrine cannot be ignored.
And yet in each of these cases there is a reasonable argument that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice
and the other factors identified by Rule 403. I do not mean that the
argument is necessarily compelling, just that a judge, constrained only
by the open balancing test of Rule 403, might well decide that the
evidence should be admissible. The fact that exclusion is nevertheless
clearly the proper result in each of these cases suggests that the law
makes critical one or more factors that a judge might not consider, or
give much weight to, in a Rule 403 determination. These might include,
for example, the confrontation rights of a criminal defendant, the best
evidence principle, the desire to avoid punishing people for crimes not
charged in the indictment, the need to protect a confidential channel of
communication between client and lawyer, and a policy that the
intrusion into one's personal life entailed by bringing a rape complaint
should be minimized.
I am not suggesting that Rule 403 cannot be understood to
comprehend such factors. I am inclined to agree with Judge Posner that
Rule 403 should be understood as a broad authority to the courts to
weigh costs and benefits-but only to the extent some narrower rule
does not govern. Read this way, however, Rule 403 is not particularly
informative. One certainly could make arguments that a sound analysis
under Rule 403 would lead to the results prescribed by conventional
doctrine in cases like the hypotheticals set out above. In doing so,
though, one would essentially be reconstructing that doctrine, simply
cramming it into a Rule 403 rubric.
And, of course, an analyst not shackled by prevailing doctrine
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might conclude that many of the results prescribed by that doctrine,
even in clear-cut cases like the above hypotheticals, are not optimal. If
evidence law is wrongheaded, that makes it no less worthy of study,
even in schools with high intellectual aspirations that avoid treating
study of the law as simply the absorption of currently prevailing
doctrine. Bad law can persist for quite a long time, and must be
understood; understanding law requires more study when the law is bad
than when it is good, for the very reason that it is less likely to flow
naturally from sound first principles; and the goal of improving law
requires particularly that bad law be studied and understood. There is
plenty of bad evidence law. For starters, the entire doctrine of hearsay
desperately needs a revamping, and it provides much of the meat of a
conventional Evidence course.
So I continue to believe that there is an important role played by
that type of course, and the scholarship that centers around it. I do not
mean to be smug. I take seriously Judge Posner's point that we should
try hard to get as much of the feel of the courtroom as possible in the
course. And he is surely right that most of us would benefit by taking a
more empirical and cross-disciplinary approach to the subject than we
do, though I believe there are limits to what empirical studies can tell us
about how the law of evidence should be shaped.5 Finally, and
regrettably, I believe that Judge Posner is probably correct in saying
"that much of the analytically most sophisticated work in evidence,
based on statistical theory, psychology, and epistemology, just is not
getting through to the decision-making class." If that is correct, the
problem is not that such disciplines-and in particular Bayesian
probability theory-have little to offer in providing the groundwork for
addressing real problems in evidentiary law. Rather, the problem may
be that those of us who tend to use such methods have, in typical
academic fashion, been more active in arguing to each other than in
engaging in the decision-making process.6
I have taken the view that economics is one of the disciplines that,
at least potentially, has a good deal to offer the study of evidence. 7 But,
just as evidence law cannot be reduced to a sophisticated application of
5. 1 have made this point in Richard D. Friedman, "E" is for Eclectic. Multiple
Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 2029 (2001).
6. 1 am not sure the fault is entirely ours. There is a limit to how much judges

and lawmakers want to hear from academics.
7. See generally Friedman, supra note 5, at 2036-40; Richard D. Friedman,
Economic Analysis of EvidentiaryLaw: An Underused Tool, an Underplowed Field, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1531 (1998).
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Rule 403, neither cost-benefit analysis nor any other economic
technique is likely to provide an overall organizing tool for evidence
law. So long as Judge Posner sojourns in Evidenceland, he will find
most of the residents unwilling to kneel before an economic throne.
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